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Abstract—Ensuring correctness of smart contracts is
paramount to ensuring trust in blockchain-based systems. This
paper studies the safety and security of smart contracts in
the Azure Blockchain Workbench, an enterprise Blockchain-as-
a-Service offering from Microsoft. As part of this study, we
formalize semantic conformance of smart contracts against a
state machine model with access-control policy and develop a
highly-automated formal verifier for Solidity that can produce
proofs as well as counterexamples. We have applied our verifier
VERISOL to analyze all contracts shipped with the Azure
Blockchain Workbench, which includes application samples as
well as a governance contract for Proof of Authority (PoA).
We have found previously unknown bugs in these published
smart contracts. After fixing these bugs, VERISOL was able to
successfully perform full verification for all of these contracts.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a decentralized and distributed consensus protocol to
maintain and secure a shared ledger, the blockchain is seen as
a disruptive technology with far-reaching impact on diverse
areas. As a result, major cloud platform companies, including
Microsoft, IBM, Amazon, SAP, and Oracle, are offering
Blockchain-as-a-Service (BaaS) solutions, primarily targeting
enterprise scenarios, such as financial services, supply chains,
escrow, and consortium governance. A recent study by Gartner
predicts that the business value-add of the blockchain has the
potential to exceed $3.1 trillion by 2030 [16].
Programs running on the blockchain are known as smart
contracts. The popular Ethereum blockchain provides a low-
level stack-based bytecode language that executes on top of
the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). High-level languages
such as Solidity and Serpent have been developed to enable
traditional application developers to author smart contracts.
However, because blockchain transactions are immutable, bugs
in smart contract code have devastating consequences, and
vulnerabilities in smart contracts have resulted in several
high-profile exploits that undermine trust in the underlying
blockchain technology. For example, the infamous TheDAO
exploit [1] resulted in the loss of almost $60 million worth of
Ether, and the Parity Wallet bug caused 169 million USD
worth of ether to be locked forever [4]. The only remedy for
these incidents was to hard-fork the blockchain and revert one
of the forks back to the state before the incident. However,
this remedy itself is devastating as it defeats the core values
of blockchain, such as immutability, decentralized trust, and
self-governance. This situation leaves no options for smart
contract programmers other than writing correct code to start
with.
Motivated by the serious consequences of bugs in smart
contract code, recent work has studied many types of security
bugs such as reentrancy, integer underflow/overflow, and issues
related to delegatecalls on Ethereum. While these low-level
bugs have drawn much attention due to high-visibility incidents
on public blockchains, we believe that the BaaS infrastructure
and enterprise scenarios bring a set of interesting, yet less
well-studied security problems.
In this paper, we present our research on smart contract
correctness in the context of Azure Blockchain, a BaaS solution
offered by Microsoft [3]. Specifically, we focus on a cloud
service named Azure Blockchain Workbench (or Workbench
for short) [6], [7]. The Workbench allows an enterprise
customer to easily build and deploy a smart contract application
integrating active directory, database, web UI, blob storage, etc.
A customer implements the smart contract application (that
meets the requirements specified in an application policy) and
uploads it onto the Workbench. The code is then deployed
to the underlying blockchain ledger to function as an end-to-
end application. In addition to customer (application) smart
contracts, the Workbench system itself is comprised of smart
contracts that customize the underlying distributed blockchain
consensus protocols. Workbench ships one such smart contract
for the governance of the Ethereum blockchain that uses the
Proof-of-Authority (PoA) consensus protocol for validating
transactions. Workbench relies on the correctness of the PoA
governance contract to offer a trusted blockchain on Azure.
Customer contracts in the Workbench architecture implement
complex business logic, starting with a high-level finite-state-
machine (FSM) workflow policy specified in a JSON file.
Intuitively, the workflow describes (a) a set of categories of
users called roles, (b) the different states of a contract, and
(c) the set of enabled actions (or functions) at each state
restricted to each role. The high-level policy is useful to
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design contracts around state machine abstractions as well
as specify the required access-control for the actions. While
these state machines offer powerful abstraction patterns during
smart contract design, it is non-trivial to decide whether a
given smart contract faithfully implements the intended FSM.
In this paper, we define semantic conformance checking as
the problem of deciding whether a customer contract correctly
implements the underlying workflow policy expressed as an
FSM. Given a Workbench policy pi that describes the workflow
and a contract C, our approach first constructs a new contract
C′ such that C semantically conforms to pi if and only if C′
does not fail any assertions.
In order to automatically check the correctness of the
assertions in a smart contract (such as C′ or PoA governance),
we develop a new verifier called VERISOL for smart contracts
written in Solidity. VERISOL is a general-purpose Solidity
verifier and is not tied to Workbench. The verifier encodes the
semantics of Solidity programs into a low-level intermediate
verification language Boogie and leverages the well-engineered
Boogie verification pipeline [14] for both verification and
counter-example generation. In particular, VERISOL takes ad-
vantage of existing bounded model checking tool CORRAL [24]
for Boogie to generate witnesses to assertion violations, and it
leverages practical verification condition generators for Boogie
to automate correctness proofs. In addition, VERISOL uses
monomial predicate abstraction [17], [22] to automatically
infer so-called contract invariants, which we have found to be
crucial for automatic verification of semantic conformance.
To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of VERISOL, we
have performed an experiment on all 11 sample applications
that are shipped with the Workbench, as well as the PoA
governance contract for the blockchain itself. VERISOL finds 4
previously unknown defects in these published smart contracts,
all of which have been confirmed as true bugs by the developers
(many of them fixed at the time of writing). The experimental
results also demonstrate the practicality of VERISOL in that
it can perform full verification of all the fixed contracts with
modest effort; most notably, VERISOL can automatically verify
10 out of 11 of the fixed versions of sample smart contracts
within 1.7 seconds on average.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contributions:
1) We study the safety and security of smart contracts present
in Workbench, a BaaS offering.
2) We formalize the Workbench application policy language
and define the semantic conformance checking problem
between a contract and a policy.
3) We develop a new formal verifier VERISOL for smart
contracts written in Solidity.
4) We perform an evaluation of VERISOL on all the contracts
shipped with Workbench. This includes all the application
samples as well as the highly-trusted PoA governance
contract.
5) We report previously unknown bugs that have been con-
firmed and several already fixed.
Application Roles:
  Requestor  (REQ)
  Responder (RES)
TF: SendResponse
TF: SendRequest
Request Respond
AR: RES
AIR: REQ
Legend
TF: Transition Function
AIR: Allowed Instance Role
AR: Allowed Role
Fig. 1. Workflow policy diagram for HelloBlockchain application.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we give an example of a Workbench
application policy for a sample contract and describe our
approach for semantic conformance checking between the
contract and the policy.
A. Workbench Application Policy
Workbench requires every customer to provide a policy (or
model) representing the high-level workflow of the application
in a JSON file1. The policy consists of several attributes such as
the application name and description, a set of roles, as well as
a set of workflows. For example, Figure 1 provides an informal
pictorial representation of the policy for a simple application
called HelloBlockchain. 2. The application consists of two
global roles (see “Application Roles”), namely REQUESTOR
and RESPONDER. Informally, each role represents a set of
user addresses and provides access control or permissions for
various actions exposed by the application. We distinguish a
global role from an instance role in that the latter applies to a
specific instance of the workflow. It is expected that the instance
roles are always a subset of the user addresses associated with
the global role.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the simple HelloBlockchain
application consists of a single workflow with two states,
namely Request and Respond. The data members (or fields)
include instance role members (Requestor and Responder)
that range over user addresses. The workflow consists of two
actions (or functions) in addition to the constructor function,
SendRequest and SendResponse, both of which take a string
as argument.
A transition in the workflow consists of a start state, an
action or function, an access control list, and a set of successor
states. Figure 1 describes two transitions, one from each of the
two states. For example, the application can transition from
Request to Respond if a user belongs to the RESPONDER role
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/blockchain/workbench/
configuration
2The example related details can be found on the associated web page: https:
//github.com/Azure-Samples/blockchain/tree/master/blockchain-workbench/
application-and-smart-contract-samples/hello-blockchain
(AR) and invokes the action SendResponse. An “Application
Instance Role” (AIR) refers to an instance role data member
of the workflow that stores a member of a global role (such
as Requestor). For instance, the transition from Respond to
Request in Figure 1 uses an AIR and is only allowed if the
user address matches the value stored in the instance data
variable Requestor.
pragma solidity ^0.4.20;
contract HelloBlockchain {
//Set of States
enum StateType {Request, Respond}
//List of properties
StateType public State;
address public Requestor;
address public Responder;
string public RequestMessage;
string public ResponseMessage;
// constructor function
function HelloBlockchain(string message)
constructor_checker()
public
{
Requestor = msg.sender;
RequestMessage = message;
State = StateType.Request;
}
// call this function to send a request
function SendRequest(string requestMessage)
SendRequest_checker() public
{
RequestMessage = requestMessage;
State = StateType.Request;
}
// call this function to send a response
function SendResponse(string responseMessage)
SendResponse_checker() public
{
Responder = msg.sender;
ResponseMessage = responseMessage;
State = StateType.Respond;
}
<modifier definitions>
}
Fig. 2. Solidity contract for HelloBlockchain application.
B. Workbench Application Smart Contract
After specifying the application policy, a user provides a
smart contract for the appropriate blockchain ledger to imple-
ment the workflow. Currently, Workbench supports the popular
language Solidity for targeting applications on Ethereum.
Figure 2 describes a Solidity smart contract that implements
the HelloBlockchain workflow in the HelloBlockchain
application. For the purpose of this sub-section, we start by
ignoring the portions of the code that are underlined. The
contract declares the data members present in the configuration
as state variables with suitable types. Each contract implement-
ing a workflow defines an additional state variable State to
track the current state of a workflow. The contract consists of
the constructor function along with the two functions defined
in the policy, with matching signatures. The functions set the
state variables and update the state variables appropriately to
reflect the state transitions.
The Workbench service allows a user to upload the policy, the
Solidity code, and optionally add users and perform various
actions permitted by the configuration. Although the smart
contract drives the application, the policy is used to expose
the set of enabled actions at each state for a given user.
Discrepancies between the policy and Solidity code can lead
to unexpected state transitions that do not conform to the high-
level policy. To ensure the correct functioning and security of
the application, it is crucial to verify that the Solidity program
semantically conforms to the intended meaning of the policy
configuration.
C. Semantic Conformance Verification
Given the application policy and a smart contract, we
define the problem of semantic conformance between the
two that ensures that the smart contract respects the policy
(Section III-B). Moreover, we reduce the semantic conformance
verification problem to checking assertions on an instrumented
Solidity program. For the HelloBlockchain application, the
instrumentation is provided by adding the underlined modifier
invocations in Figure 2. A modifier is a Solidity language
construct that allows wrapping a function invocation with code
that executes before and after the execution.
function nondet() returns (bool); //no definition
// Checker modifiers
modifier constructor_checker()
{
_;
assert (nondet() /* global role REQUESTOR */
==> State == StateType.Request);
}
modifier SendRequest_checker()
{
StateType oldState = State;
address oldRequestor = Requestor;
_;
assert ((msg.sender == oldRequestor &&
oldState == StateType.Respond)
==> State == StateType.Request);
}
modifier SendResponse_checker()
{
StateType oldState = State;
_;
assert ((nondet() /* global role RESPONDER */ &&
oldState == StateType.Request)
==> State == StateType.Respond);
}
Fig. 3. Modifier definitions for instrumented HelloBlockchain application.
Figure 3 shows the definition of the modifiers used to
instrument for conformance checking. Intuitively, we wrap
the constructor and functions with checks to ensure that they
implement the FSM state transitions correctly. For example,
if the FSM transitions from a state s1 to a state s2 upon the
invocation of function f by a user with access control ac, then
we instrument the definition of f to ensure that any execution
starting in s1 with access control satisfying ac should transition
to s2.
Finally, given the instrumented Solidity program, we dis-
charge the assertions statically using a new formal verifier for
Solidity called VERISOL. The verifier can find counterexamples
(in the form of a sequence of transactions involving calls to the
constructor and public methods) as well as automatically con-
struct proofs of semantic conformance. Note that, even though
the simple HelloBlockchain example does not contain any
unbounded loops or recursion, verifying semantic conformance
still requires reasoning about executions that involve unbounded
numbers of calls to the two public functions. We demonstrate
that VERISOL is able to find deep violations of the conformance
property for well-tested Workbench applications, as well
as automatically construct inductive proofs for most of the
application samples shipped with Workbench.
III. SEMANTIC CONFORMANCE CHECKING FOR
WORKBENCH POLICIES
In this section, we formalize the Workbench application
policy that we informally introduced in Section II. Our formal-
ization can be seen as a mathematical representation of the
official Workbench application JSON schema documentation.
A. Formalization of Workbench Application Policies
The Workbench policy for an application allows the user to
describe (i) the data members and actions of an application,
(ii) a high-level state-machine view of the application, and (iii)
role-based access control for state transitions. The role-based
access control provides security for deploying smart contracts
in an open and adversarial setting; the high-level state machine
naturally captures the essence of a workflow that progresses
between a set of states based on some actions from the user.
More formally, a Workbench Application Policy is a pair
(R,W) where R is a set of global roles used for access
control, and W is a set of workflows defining a kind of finite
state machine. Specifically, a workflow is defined by a tuple
〈S, s0,Rw,F,F0, ac0, γ〉 where:
• S is a finite set of states, and s0 ∈ S is an initial state
• Rw is a finite set of instance roles of the form (id : t),
where id is an identifier and t is a role drawn from R
• F(id0, . . . , idk) is a set of actions (functions), with F0
denoting an initial action (constructor)
• ac0 ⊆ R is the initiator role for restricting users that can
create an instance of the contract
• γ ⊆ S × F × (Rw ∪R)× 2S is a set of transitions. Given
a transition τ = (s, f, ac, S), we write τ.s, τ.f, τ.ac, τ.S to
denote s, f, ac, and S respectively
Intuitively, S defines the different “states” that the contract
can be in, and γ describes which state can transition to what
other states by performing certain actions. The transitions are
additionally “guarded” by roles (which can be either global or
instance roles) that qualify which users are allowed to perform
those actions. As mentioned earlier in Section II, each “role”
corresponds to a set of users (i.e., addresses on the blockchain).
The use of instance roles in the workbench policy allows
different instances of the contract to authorize different users
to perform certain actions.
B. Semantic Conformance
Given a contract C and a Workbench Application policy
pi, semantic conformance between C and pi requires that the
contract C faithfully implements the policy specified by pi. In
this subsection, we first define some syntactic requirements on
the contract, and then formalize what we mean by semantic
conformance between a contract and a policy.
Syntactic conformance. Given a client contract C and a policy
pi = (R,W), our syntactic conformance requirement stipulates
that the contract for each w ∈ W implements all the instance
state variables as well as definitions for each of the functions.
Additionally, each contract function has a parameter called
sender , which is a blockchain address that denotes the user or
contract invoking this function. Finally, each contract should
contain a state variable sw that ranges over Sw, for each
w ∈ W.
Semantic conformance. We formalize the semantic conformance
requirement for smart contracts using Floyd-Hoare triples of
the form {φ} S {ψ} indicating that any execution of statement
S starting in a state satisfying φ results in a state satisfying
ψ (if the execution of S terminates). We can define semantic
conformance between a contract C and a policy pi as a set of
Hoare triples, one for each pair (m, s) where m is a method
in the contract and s is a state in the Workbench policy. At a
high-level, the idea is simple: we insist that, when a function is
executed along a transition, the resulting state transition should
be in accordance with the Workbench policy.
Given an application policy pi = (R,W) and workflow
w = 〈S, s0,Rw,F,F0, ac0, γ〉 ∈ W, we can formalize this
high-level idea by using the following Hoare triples:
1) Initiation.
{sender ∈ ac0} F0(v1, . . . , vk) {sw = s0}
The Hoare triple states that the creation of an instance of
the workflow with the appropriate access control ac0 results
in establishing the initial state.
2) Consecution. Let τ = (s1, f, ac ,S2) be a transition in
γ. Then, for each such transition, semantic conformance
requires the following Hoare triple to be valid:
{sender ∈ ac ∧ sw = s1} f(v1, . . . , vk) {sw ∈ S2}
Here, the precondition checks two facts: First, the sender
must satisfy the access control, and, second, the start
state must be s1. The post-condition asserts that the
implementation of method f in the contract results in a
state that is valid according to policy pi.
C. Instrumentation for Semantic Conformance Checking
As mentioned in Section II, our approach checks semantic
conformance of Solidity contracts by (a) instrumenting the
contract with assertions, and (b) using a verification tool to
check that none of the assertions can fail. We explain our
instrumentation strategy in this subsection and refer the reader
to Section IV for a description of our verification tool chain.
Our instrumentation methodology heavily relies on the
modifier construct in Solidity. A modifier has syntax very
similar to a function definition in Solidity with a name and
list of parameters and a body that can refer to parameters and
globals in scope. The general structure of a modifier definition
without any parameters is [2]:
modifier Foo() {
pre-stmt;
_;
post-stmt;
}
where pre-stmt and post-stmt are Solidity statements.
When this modifier is applied to a function Bar,
function Bar(int x) Foo(){
Bar-stmt;
}
the Solidity compiler transforms the body of Bar to execute
pre-stmt (respectively, post-stmt) before (respectively, af-
ter) Bar-stmt. This provides a convenient way to inject code
at multiple return sites from a procedure and also inject code
before the execution of the constructor code (since a constructor
may invoke other base class constructors implicitly).
We now define a couple of helper predicates before describ-
ing the actual checks. Let P (ac) be a predicate that encodes
the membership of sender in the set ac :
P (ac)
.
=

false, ac = {}
msg.sender = q, ac = {q ∈ Rw}
nondet() ac = {r ∈ R}
P (ac1) ∨ P (ac2) ac = ac1 ∪ ac2
Here nondet is a side-effect free Solidity function that returns
a non-deterministic Boolean value at each invocation. For the
sake of static verification, one can declare a function without
any definition. This allows us to model the membership check
sender ∈ ac conservatively in the absence of global roles on
the blockchain.
Next, we define a predicate for membership of a contract
state in a set of states S ′ ⊆ S using α(S ′) as follows:
α(S ′) .=
 false, S
′ = {}
sw = s, S ′ = {s ∈ S}
α(S1) ∨ α(S2), S ′ = S1 ∪ S2
We can now use these predicates to define the source code
transformations below:
Constructor. We add the following modifier to constructors:
modifier constructor_checker() {
_;
assert (P (ac0)⇒ α({s0}));
}
Here, the assertion ensures that the constructor sets up the
correct initial state when executed by a user with access control
ac0.
Other functions. For a function g, let γg .= {τ ∈ γ | τ =
(s1, g, ac ,S2)} be the set of all transitions where g is invoked.
call f0(*);
while (true) {
if (*) call f1(*);
else if (*) call f2(*);
...
else if (*) call fn(*);
}
Fig. 4. Harness for Solidity contracts
modifier g_checker() {
// copy old State
StateType oldState = sw;
// copy old instance role vars
...
_;
assert
∧
τ∈γg (old (P (τ.ac) ∧ α({τ.s}))⇒ α(τ.S));
}
Here, the instrumented code first copies the sw variable
and all of the variables in Rw into corresponding “old”
copies. Next, the assertion checks that if the function is
executed in a transition τ , then state transitions to one of
the successor states in τ.S. The notation old(e) replaces
any occurrences of a state variable (such as sw) with the
“old” copy that holds the value at the entry to the function.
Figure 3 shows the modifier definitions for our running example
HelloBlockchain described in Section II Although we show
the nondet() to highlight the issue of global roles, one can
safely replace nondet() with true since the function only
appears negatively in any assertion. In fact, this observation
allows us to add the simplified assertions for runtime checking
as well. Finally, since conjunction distributes over assertions,
we can replace the single assertion with an assertion for each
transition in the implementation.
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION USING VERISOL
In this section, we present our formal verifier called
VERISOL for checking the correctness of assertions in Solidity
smart contracts. Since our verifier is built on top of the
Boogie tool chain, it can be used for both verification and
counterexample generation.
A. General Methodology
Let C = {λ ~x0.f0, λ ~x1.f1, . . . , λ ~xn.fn} be a smart
contract annotated with assertions where:
• λ ~x0.f0 is the constructor
• λ~xi.fi for i ∈ [1, n] are public functions
Our verification methodology is based on finding a contract
invariant I satisfying the following Hoare triples:
|= {true} f0 {I} (1)
|= {I} fi {I} for all i ∈ [1, n] (2)
Here, the first condition states the contract invariant is
established by the constructor, and the second condition states
that I is inductive — i.e., it is preserved by every public
function in C. Note that such a contract invariant suffices to
VeriSol
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Fig. 5. Schematic workflow of VERISOL.
establish the validity of all assertions in the contract under
any possible sequence of function invocations of the contract.
To see why this is the case, consider a “harness” that invokes
the functions in C as in Figure 4. This harness first creates
an instance of the contract by calling the constructor, and
then repeatedly and non-deterministically invokes one of the
public functions of C. Observe that the Hoare triples (1) and
(2) listed above essentially state that I is an inductive invariant
of the loop in this harness; thus, the contract invariant I
overapproximates the state of the contract under any sequence
of the contract’s function invocations. Furthermore, when the
functions contain assertions, the Hoare triple {I} fi {I} can
only be proven if I is strong enough to imply the assertion
conditions. Thus, the validity of the Hoare triples in (1) and
(2) establishes correctness under all possible usage patterns of
the contract.
B. Overview
We now describe the design of our tool called VERISOL for
checking safety of smart contracts. VERISOL is based on the
proof methodology outlined in Section IV-A, and its workflow
is illustrated in Figure 5. At a high-level, VERISOL takes as
input a Solidity contract C annotated with assertions and yields
one of the following three outcomes:
• Fully verified: This means that the assertions in C are
guaranteed not to fail under any usage scenario.
• Refuted: This indicates that C was able to find at least one
input and invocation sequence of the contract functions under
which one of the assertions is guaranteed to fail.
• Partially verified: When VERISOL can neither verify nor
refute contract correctness, it performs bounded verification
to establish that the contract is safe up to k transactions.
This essentially corresponds to unrolling the ”harness” loop
from Figure 4 k times and then verifying that the assertions
do not fail in the unrolled version.
VERISOL consists of three modules, namely (a) Boogie
Translation from a Solidity program, (b) Invariant Generation
to infer a contract invariant as well as loop invariants and
procedure summaries, and (c) Bounded Model Checking to
explore assertion failures within all transactions up to a user-
specified depth k. In the remaining subsections, we discuss
each of these components in more detail.
ct ∈ ContractNames
et ∈ SolElemTypes ::= integer | string | address
st ∈ SolTypes ::= et | ct | et ⇒ st
se ∈ SolExprs ::= c | x | op(se, . . . , se) | se[se]
| msg.sender | x.length
sst ∈ SolStmts ::= x := se | x[se] . . . [se] := y | sst; sst
| require(se) | assert(se)
| if (se) {sst} else {sst}
| while (se) do {sst} | x.push(se)
| se := f(~se) | se := se.f(~se)
| se := new C(~se) | se := new t[](se)
| se := new (t1 ⇒ t2 ⇒ . . .⇒ tk ⇒ t)()
Fig. 6. A subset of Solidity language. C denotes a contract name, t denotes
an elementary Solidity type, and f denotes a function name.
C. Solidity to Boogie Translation
In this subsection, we formally describe our translation of
Solidity source code to the Boogie intermediate verification
language. We start with a brief description of Solidity and
Boogie, and then discuss our translation.
Solidity Language. Figure 6 shows a core subset of Solidity
that we use for our formalization. At a high level, Solidity is
a typed object-oriented programming language with built-in
support for basic verification constructs, such as the require
construct for expressing pre-conditions.
Types in our core language include integers, strings, contracts,
addresses, and mappings. We use the notation τ1 ⇒ τ2 to
denote a mapping from a value of type τ1 to a value of type
τ2 (where τ2 can be a nested map type). Since arrays can be
viewed as a special form of mapping integer ⇒ τ , we do not
introduce a separate array type to simplify presentation.
As standard, expressions in Solidity include constants, local
variables, state variables (i.e., fields in standard object-oriented
language terminology), unary/binary operators (denoted op),
and array/map lookup e[e′]. Given an array x, the expression
x.length yields the length of that array, and msg.sender
yields the address of the contract or user that initiates the
current function invocation.
Statements in our core Solidity language include assignments,
conditional statements, loops, sequential composition, array
insertion (push), internal and external function calls, contract
instance creation, and dynamic allocations. The construct
require is used to specify the precondition of a function, and
assert checks that its input evaluates to true and terminates
execution otherwise. Solidity differentiates between two types
of function calls: internal and external. An internal call
se := f(~se) invokes the function f and keeps msg.sender
unchanged. An external call se := se0.f(~se) invokes function
f in the contract instance pointed by se0 (which may include
this), and uses this as the msg.sender for the callee.
bbt ∈ BoogieElemTypes ::= int | Ref
bt ∈ BoogieTypes ::= bbt | [bbt ]bt
e ∈ Exprs ::= c | x | op(e, . . . , e) | uf(e, . . . , e)
| x[e] . . . [e] | ∀i : bbt :: e
st ∈ Stmts ::= skip | havoc x | x := e
| x[e] . . . [e] := e
| assume e | assert e
| call ~x := f(e, . . . , e) | st; st
| if (e) {st} else {st} | while (e) do {st}
Fig. 7. A subset of Boogie language.
We omit several aspects of the language that are desugared
into our core Solidity language. This includes fairly compre-
hensive support for modifiers, libraries and structs.
Boogie Language. Since our goal is to translate Solidity
to Boogie, we also give a brief overview of the Boogie
intermediate verification language. As shown in Figure 7,
types in Boogie include integers (int), references (Ref ),
and nested maps. Expressions (Exprs) consist of constants,
variables, arithmetic and logical operators (op), uninterpreted
functions (uf), map lookups, and quantified expressions.
Standard statements (Stmts) in Boogie consist of skip, variable
and array/map assignment, sequential composition, conditional
statements, and loops. The havoc x statement assigns an
arbitrary value of appropriate type to a variable x. A procedure
call (call ~x := f(e, . . . , e)) returns a vector of values that
can be stored in local variables. The assert and assume
statements behave as no-ops when their arguments evaluate to
true and terminate execution otherwise. An assertion failure is
considered a failing execution, whereas an assumption failure
blocks.
From Solidity to Boogie types. We define a function µ :
SolTypes → BoogieTypes that translates a Solidity type to a
type in Boogie as follows:
µ(st)
.
=
 int, st ∈ {integer , string}Ref , st ∈ {address} ∪ ContractNamesRef , st .= et ⇒ st
Specifically, we translate Solidity integers and strings to Boogie
integers; addresses, contract names, and mappings to Boogie
references. Note that we represent Solidity strings as integers in
Boogie because Solidity only allows equality checks between
strings in the core language.
From Solidity to Boogie expressions. We present our trans-
lation from Solidity to Boogie expressions using judgments
of the form ` e ↪→ χ in Figure 8, where e is a Solidity
expression and χ is the corresponding Boogie expression. While
Solidity local variables and the expression msg.sender are
mapped directly into Boogie local variables and parameters
respectively, state variables in Solidity are translated into array
lookups. Specifically, for each state variable x for contract
C, we introduce a mapping xC from contract instances o
x ∈ LocalVars
` x ↪→ x (Var1)
v = msg_sender
` msg.sender ↪→ v (Sender)
Type(c) 6= string
` c ↪→ c (Const1)
x ∈ StateVars(C)
` x ↪→ xC [this] (Var2)
Type(c) = string c′ = Hash(c)
` c ↪→ StrToInt(c′) (Const2)
` x ↪→ χ
` x.length ↪→ Length[χ] (Len)
` e1 ↪→ χ1 ` e2 ↪→ χ2
Type(e2) = t1 Type(e1[e2]) = t2
` e1[e2] ↪→Mµ(t2)µ(t1) [χ1][χ2]
(Map)
` ei ↪→ χi i = 1, . . . , n
` op(e1, . . . , en) ↪→ op(χ1, . . . , χn) (Op)
Fig. 8. Inference rules for encoding Solidity expressions to Boogie expressions.
Type(e) is a function that returns the static type of Solidity expression e.
to the value stored in its state variable x. Thus, reads from
state variable x are modeled as xC [this] in Boogie. Next, we
translate string constants in Solidity to Boogie integers using
an uninterpreted function called StrToInt that is applied to a
hash of the string 3. As mentioned earlier, this string-to-integer
translation does not cause imprecision because Solidity only
allows equality checks between variables of type string.
Similar to our handling of state variables, our Boogie
encoding also introduces an array called Length to map each
Solidity array to its corresponding length. Thus, a Solidity
expression x.length is translated as Length[χ] where χ is
the Boogie encoding of x.
The translation of array/map look-up is somewhat more
involved due to potential aliasing issues. First, the basic idea
is that for each map of type t1 ⇒ t2, we introduce a Boogie
map Mτ
′
τ where τ is the Boogie encoding of type t1 (i.e.,
τ = µ(t1)) and τ ′ is the Boogie encoding of type t2 (i.e.,
τ ′ = µ(t2)). Intuitively, Mτ
′
τ maps each array/map object to
its contents, which are in turn represented as a map. Thus, we
can think of Mτ
′
τ as a two-dimensional mapping where the first
dimension is the address of the Solidity map and the second
dimension is the look-up key. For a nested map expression e1
of type t1 ⇒ t2 where t2 is a nested map/array, observe that
we look up e1 in MRefµ(t1) since maps and arrays in Solidity
are dynamically allocated. Intuitively, everything that can be
dynamically allocated is represented with type Ref in our
encoding to allow for potential aliasing.
Example 1. Suppose that contract C has a state variable x of
Solidity type mapping(int => int[]), which corresponds to
the type int => (int => int) in our core Solidity language.
3We assume that the hash function is collision-free. In our implementation,
we enforce this by keeping a mapping from each string constant to a counter.
The expression x[0][1] will be translated into the Boogie
expression M intint [e][1] where e is M
Ref
int [ x
C [this] ][0] using
the rules from Figure 8.
From Solidity to Boogie statements. Figure 9 presents the
translation from Solidity to Boogie statements using judgments
of the form ` s  ω indicating that Solidity statement s
is translated to Boogie statement(s) ω. Since most rules in
Figure 9 are self-explanatory, we only explain our translation
for assignments, function calls, and dynamic allocations.
Function calls. Functions in Solidity have two implicit parame-
ters, namely this for the receiver object and msg.sender for
the Blockchain address of the caller. Thus, when translating
Solidity calls to their corresponding Boogie version, we
explicitly pass these parameters in the Boogie version. However,
recall that the value of the implicit msg.sender parameter
varies depending on whether the call is external or internal. For
internal calls, msg.sender remains unchanged, whereas for
external calls, msg.sender becomes the current receiver object.
For both types of calls, our translation introduces a conditional
statement to deal with dynamic dispatch. Specifically, our
Boogie encoding introduces a map τ to store the dynamic type
of receiver objects at allocation sites, and the translation of
function calls invokes the correct version of the method based
on the content of τ for the receiver object.
Dynamic allocation. Dynamic memory allocations in Solidity
are translated into Boogie code with the aid of a helper
procedure New (shown in Figure 10) which always returns a
fresh reference. As shown in Figure 10, the New procedure is
implemented using a global map Alloc to indicate whether
a reference is allocated or not. All three types of dynamic
memory allocation (contract, array, and map) use this helper
New procedure to generate Boogie code.
In the case of contract creation (labeled NewCont in
Figure 9), the Boogie code we generate updates the τ map
mentioned previously in addition to allocating new memory.
Specifically, given the freshly allocated reference v returned by
New, we initialize τ [v] to be C and also call C’s constructor
as required by Solidity semantics.
Next, let us consider the allocation of array objects described
in rule NewArr in Figure 9. Recall that our Boogie encoding
uses a map called Length to keep track of the size of
every array. Thus, in addition to allocating new memory, the
translation of array allocation also updates the Length array
and initializes all elements in the array to be zero (or null).
Finally, the rule NewMap shows how to translate map alloca-
tions in Solidity to Boogie using an auxiliary Boogie procedure
called MapInit (shown in Figure 10) for map initialization.
Given an n-dimensional map, the MapInit procedure iteratively
allocates lower dimensional maps and ensures that values
stored in the map do not alias each other as well as any
other previously allocated reference.
Example 2. The Solidity code
x := new (int => int => int)()
is translated into the following Boogie code:
1 call v := New(); assume Length[v] = 0;
2 assume ∀i :: Length[MRefint [v][i]] = 0;
3 assume ∀i :: ¬Alloc[MRefint [v][i]];
4 call NewUnbounded();
5 assume ∀i :: Alloc[MRefint [v][i]];
6 assume ∀i,j :: i=j ∨ MRefint [v][i] 6= MRefint [v][j];
7 assume ∀i,j :: M intint [MRefint [v][i]][j] = 0;
8 xC [this] := v;
First of all, we allocate a fresh reference v and initialize the
length of v and every inner map v[i] to zero (lines 1 - 2).
Second, we allocate fresh references for every inner map v[i]
(lines 3 - 5), and ensure the references of inner maps v[i]
and v[j] do not alias if i 6= j (line 6). Finally, we initialize
every element v[i][j] to zero and assign reference v to the state
variable x (lines 7 - 8).
D. Invariant Generation
As mentioned earlier, translating Solidity code into Boogie al-
lows VERISOL to leverage the existing ecosystem around Boo-
gie, including efficient verification condition generation [25].
However, in order to completely automate verification (even
for loop and recursion-free contracts), we still need to infer
a suitable contract invariant as discussed in Section IV-B.
Specifically, recall that the contract invariant must satisfy the
following two properties:
1) |= {true} f0 {I}
2) |= {I} fi {I} for all i ∈ [1, n]
VERISOL uses monomial predicate abstraction ( [17], [22],
[23]) to automatically infer contract invariants satisfying the
above properties. Specifically, the contract invariant inference
algorithm conjectures the conjunction of all candidate predi-
cates as an inductive invariant and progressively weakens it
based on failure to prove a candidate predicate inductive. This
algorithm converges fairly fast even on large examples but
relies on starting with a superset of necessary predicates. In
the current implementation of VERISOL, we obtain candidate
invariants by instantiating the predicate template e1 ./ e2 where
./ is either equality or disequality. Here, expressions e1, e2
can be instantiated with variables corresponding to roles and
states in the Workbench policy as well as constants. We have
found these candidate predicates to be sufficiently general for
automatically verifying semantic conformance of Workbench
contracts; however, additional predicates may be required for
other types of contracts.
E. Bounded Model Checking
If VERISOL fails to verify contract correctness using
monomial predicate abstraction, it employs an assertion-
directed bounded verifier, namely CORRAL [24], to look
for a transaction sequence leading to an assertion violation.
CORRAL analyzes the harness in Figure 4 by unrolling the
loop k times and uses a combination of abstraction refinement
techniques (including lazy inlining of nested procedures) to
look for counterexamples in a scalable manner. Thus, when
VERISOL fails to verify the property, it either successfully finds
a counterexample or verifies the lack of any counterexample
with k transactions.
` e1 ↪→ χ1 ` e2 ↪→ χ2
` e1 := e2  χ1 := χ2 (Asgn)
` e ↪→ χ
` require(e) assume χ (Req)
` e ↪→ χ
` assert(e) assert χ (Asrt)
` e ↪→ χ ` s1  ω1 ` s2  ω2
` if (e) {s1} else {s2} if (χ) {ω1} else {ω2} (Cond)
` e ↪→ χ ` s ω
` while (e) do {s} while (χ) do {ω} (Loop)
` er ↪→ χr ` ei ↪→ χi i = 0, . . . , n fresh v Cj <: Type(this) j = 1, . . . ,m
ω ≡ if (τ [this] = C1) {call v := fC1(this, χ1, . . . , χn, msg_sender); χr := v} else if . . .
else if (τ [this] = Cm) {call v := fCm(this, χ1, . . . , χn, msg_sender); χr := v}
` er := f(e1, . . . , en) ω (IntCall)
` er ↪→ χr ` ei ↪→ χi i = 0, . . . , n fresh v Cj <: Type(e0) j = 1, . . . ,m
ω ≡ if (τ [χ0] = C1) {call v := fC1(χ0, χ1, . . . , χn, this); χr := v} else if . . .
else if (τ [χ0] = Cm) {call v := fCm(χ0, χ1, . . . , χn, this); χr := v}
` er := e0.f(e1, . . . , en) ω (ExtCall)
` er ↪→ χr ` ei ↪→ χi i = 1, . . . , n fresh v
ω ≡ call v := New(); assume τ [v] = C; call fC0 (v, χ1, . . . , χn, this); χr := v
` er := new C(e1, . . . , en) ω (NewCont)
` x[x.Length++] := e ω
` x.push(e) ω (Push)
` er ↪→ χr ` e ↪→ χ fresh v ` v[i] ↪→ χi
ω ≡ call v := New(); Length[v] := χ; assume ∀i :: χi = 0; χr := v
` er := new t[](e) ω (NewArr)
` s1  ω1
` s2  ω2
` s1; s2  ω1;ω2 (Seq)
` er ↪→ χr fresh v ` v[i1] . . . [in] ↪→ χ
ω ≡ call v := New(); call MapInit(v, n); assume ∀i1, . . . , in :: χ = 0; χr := v
` er := new (t1 ⇒ . . .⇒ tn ⇒ t)() ω (NewMap)
Fig. 9. Inference rules for encoding Solidity statements to Boogie statements. Type(e) is a function that returns the static type of Solidity expression e. Symbol
fC denotes the function f in contract C, and fC0 denotes the constructor of contract C. The <: relation represents the sub-typing relationship. τ is a global
Boogie map that maps receiver objects to their dynamic types. Types for universally quantified Boogie variables are omitted for brevity.
var Alloc: [Ref]bool;
procedure New() returns (ret: Ref) {
havoc ret; assume (!Alloc[ret]);
Alloc[ret] := true;
}
procedure NewUnbounded() {
var oldAlloc: [Ref]bool;
oldAlloc := Alloc; havoc Alloc;
assume ∀i::oldAlloc[i] ==> Alloc[i];
}
procedure MapInit(v: Ref, n: int) {
var j: int; j := 1; Length[v] := 0;
while (j < n) {
assume ∀i1, . . . , ij ::Length[χ(v, i1, . . . , ij)]=0;
assume ∀i1, . . . , ij ::¬Alloc[χ(v, i1, . . . , ij)];
call NewUnbounded();
assume ∀i1, . . . , ij ::Alloc[χ(v, i1, . . . , ij)];
assume ∀i1, . . . , ij , i′j ::(ij = i′j) ∨ χ(v, i1, . . . , ij) 6= χ(v, i1, . . . , i′j);
j := j + 1; }
}
Fig. 10. Auxiliary Boogie procedures. The term χ(v, i1, . . . , ij) denotes the
translation result of Solidity expression v[i1] . . . [ij ]. Types for universally
quantified Boogie variables are omitted for brevity.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of VERISOL
by performing two sets of experiments on smart contracts
shipped with Workbench: (i) semantic conformance checking
for Workbench samples, and (ii) checking safety and security
properties for the PoA governance contract. The goal of our
evaluation is to answer the following research questions:
RQ1 How does VERISOL perform when checking semantic
conformance of Workbench application policies?
RQ2 How applicable is VERISOL on smart contracts with
complex data structures (such as PoA)?
Experimental Setup. Due to limited resources, we set our
timeout as one hour for every benchmark. All experiments
are conducted on a machine with Intel Xeon(R) E5-1620 v3
CPU and 32GB of physical memory, running the Ubuntu 14.04
operating system.
A. Semantic Conformance for Workbench Application Policies
Benchmarks. We have collected all sample smart contracts that
are shipped with Workbench and their corresponding applica-
tion policies on the Github repository of Azure Blockchain [5].
These smart contracts and their policies depict various workflow
scenarios that are representative in real-world enterprise use
cases. The smart contracts exercise various features of Solidity
such as arrays, nested contract creation, external calls, enum
types, and mutual-recursion. For each smart contract C and its
application policy pi, we perform program instrumentation as
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEMANTIC CONFORMANCE AGAINST WORKBENCH APPLICATION POLICIES.
Name Description Orig Inst Init Status Status after Fix Time (s)SLOC SLOC
AssetTransfer Selling high-value assets 192 444 Refuted Fully Verified 2.1
BasicProvenance Keeping record of ownership 43 95 Fully Verified Fully Verified 1.5
BazaarItemListing Multiple workflow scenario for selling items 98 175 Refuted Fully Verified 2.3
DefectCompCounter Product counting using arrays for manufacturers 31 68 Fully Verified Fully Verified 1.3
DigitalLocker Sharing digitally locked files 129 260 Refuted Fully Verified 1.7
FreqFlyerRewards Calculating frequent flyer rewards using arrays 47 90 Fully Verified Fully Verified 1.3
HelloBlockchain Request and response (Figure 1) 32 78 Fully Verified Fully Verified 1.3
PingPongGame Multiple workflow for two-player games 74 136 Refuted Fully Verified (manual) 2.1
RefrigTransport Provenance scenario with IoT monitoring 118 187 Fully Verified Fully Verified 2.2
RoomThermostat Thermostat installation and use 42 99 Fully Verified Fully Verified 1.3
SimpleMarketplace Owner and buyer transactions 62 118 Fully Verified Fully Verified 1.4
Average - 79 159 - - 1.7
explained in Section III-C to obtain contract C′. Note that no
assertion failure of C′ is equivalent to the semantic conformance
between C and pi, so we include such instrumented smart
contracts in our benchmark set.
Main Results. Table I summarizes the results of our first
experimental evaluation. Here, the “Name” column gives the
name of the contract, and the “Description” column describes
the contract’s usage scenario. The next two columns give
the number of lines of Solidity code before and after the
instrumentation described in Section III-C. The last three
columns present the main verification results: In particular,
“Init Status” shows the result of applying VERISOL on the
original smart contract, and “Status after Fix” presents the
result of VERISOL after we manually fix the bug (if any).
The fix may require changing either the policy or the contract,
depending on the contract author’s feedback. Finally, “Time”
shows the running time of VERISOL in seconds when applied
to the fixed contracts.
Our experimental results demonstrate that VERISOL is
useful for checking semantic conformance between Workbench
contracts and the policies they are supposed to implement.
In particular, VERISOL finds bugs in 4 of 11 well-tested
contracts and precisely pinpoints the trace leading to the
violation. Our results also demonstrate that VERISOL can
effectively automate semantic conformance proofs, as it can
successfully verify all the contracts after fixing the original
bug. Moreover, for 10 out of the 11 contracts with the
exception of PingPongGame, the invariant inference techniques
sufficed to make the proofs completely push-button. Our
candidate templates for contract invariant did not suffice for the
PingPongGame contract mainly due to the presence of mutually
recursive functions between two contracts. This required us to
manually provide a function summary for the mutually recursive
procedures that states an invariant over the state variable sw
of the sender contract represented by the msg.sender (e.g.
sw[msg.sender] = s1 ∨ sw[msg.sender] = s2 where si are
states of the sender contract). This illustrates that we can
achieve the power of the underlying sound Boogie modular
verification to perform non-trivial proofs with modest manual
function Accept() public
{
if (msg.sender != InstanceBuyer &&
msg.sender != InstanceOwner) {
revert();
}
...
if (msg.sender == InstanceBuyer) {
...
}
else {
// msg.sender has to be InstanceOwner
// from the revert earlier
if (State == StateType.NotionalAcceptance) {
State = StateType.SellerAccepted;
}
else if (State == StateType.BuyerAccepted) {
// NON-CONFORMANCE: JSON transitions
// to StateType.SellerAccepted
State = StateType.Accepted;
}
}
...
}
Fig. 11. Buggy function Accept of AssetTransfer.
overhead. We are currently working on extending the templates
for contract invariant inference to richer templates for inferring
postconditions for recursive procedures.
Bug Analysis. We report and analyze the five bugs that
VERISOL found in the Azure Blockchain Workbench sample
contracts. These bugs can be categorized into two classes: (i)
incorrect state transition, and (ii) incorrect initial state. We
briefly discuss these two classes of bugs.
Incorrect state transition. This class of bugs arises when
the implementation of a function in the contract violates the
state transition stated by the policy. VERISOL has found such
non-conformance in the AssetTransfer and PingPongGame
contracts. For instance, let us consider AssetTransfer 4 as a
concrete example. In this contract, actions are guarded by the
membership of msg.sender within one of the roles or instance
role variables (see Figure 11). VERISOL found the transition
4https://github.com/Azure-Samples/blockchain/tree/master/
blockchain-workbench/application-and-smart-contract-samples/asset-transfer
from state BuyerAccepted to state Accepted in the Accept
function had no matching transitions in the policy. Specif-
ically, the policy allows a transition from BuyerAccepted
to SellerAccepted when invoking the function Accept and
msg.sender equals the instance role variable InstanceOwner.
However, the implementation of function Accept transitions
to the state Accepted instead of SellerAccepted. From
the perspective of the bounded verifier, this is a fairly deep
bug, as it requires at least 6 transactions to reach the state
BuyerAccepted from the initial state.
Incorrect initial state. This class of bugs arises when the initial
state of a smart contract is not established as instructed by the
corresponding policy. We have found such non-conformance
in DigitalLocker and BazaarItemListing. For instance,
the policy of DigitalLocker requires the initial state of the
smart contract to be Requested, but the implementation ends
up incorrectly setting the initial state to DocumentReview. In
the BazaarItemListing benchmark, the developer fails to
set the initial state of the contract despite the policy requiring
it to be set to ItemAvailable.
B. Security Properties of PoA Governance Contract
In this section, we discuss our experience applying VERISOL
to PoA governance contracts. We first give some background
on PoA and then discuss experimental results.
Background on PoA governance contracts. In addition
to application samples, Workbench also ships a core smart
contract that constitutes an integral part of the Workbench
system stack. PoA is an alternative to the popular Proof-of-
Work (PoW) consensus protocol for permissioned blockchains,
which consist of a set of nodes running the protocol and
validating transactions to be appended to a block that will be
committed on the ledger [9]. Validators belong to different
organizations, where each organization is represented by an
administrator. The protocol for admin addition, removal, voting,
and validator set management is implemented as the PoA
governance contract. It implements the Parity Ethereum’s
ValidatorSet contract interface and is distributed on the Azure
Blockchain github [8]. The smart contract consists of five
component contracts (ValidatorSet, SimpleValidatorSet,
AdminValidatorSet, Admin, AdminSet) totaling around 600
lines of Solidity code. The correctness of the PoA governance
contract underpins the trust on Workbench as well the rest of
Azure Blockchain offering.
The smart contract uses several features that make it a
challenging benchmark for Solidity smart contract reasoning.
We outline some of them here:
• The contracts use multiple levels of inheritance since the
top-level contract AdminValidatorSet derives from the
contract SimpleValidatorSet which in turn derives from
ValidatorSet interface.
• It uses sophisticated access control using Solidity modifiers to
restrict which users and contracts can alter states of different
contracts.
• The contracts maintain deeply nested mappings and arrays
to store the set of validators for different admins.
• The contracts use nested loops and procedures to iterate
over the arrays and use arithmetic operations to reason about
majority voting.
Properties. We examined three key properties of the PoA
contract:
P1: At least one admin: The network starts out with a single
admin at bootstrapping, but the set of admins should
never become empty. If this property is violated, the
entire network will enter into a frozen state where any
subsequent transaction will revert.
P2: Correctness of AdminSet: The AdminSet is a contract
that exposes a set interface to perform constant time
operations such as lookup. Since Solidity does not
permit enumerating all the keys in a mapping, the set
is implemented as a combination of an array of members
addressList and a Boolean mapping inSet to map
the members to true. The property checks the coupling
between these two data structures — (i) addressList
has no repeated elements, (ii) inSet[a] is true iff there
is an index j such that addressList[j] == a.
P3: Element removal: Deleting an element from an array
is a commonly used operation for PoA contracts. PoA
correctness relies on invoking this procedure only for an
element that is a member of the array.
Bugs found. To check the three correctness properties (P1),
(P2), (P3) described above, we first annotated the PoA
governance contracts with appropriate assertions and then
analyzed them using VERISOL. In addition to uncovering a
previously known violation of the “at least one admin” property,
VERISOL identified a few other bugs that have been confirmed
and fixed by the developers. In particular, VERISOL found a
bug that results in the violation of property (P3): When an
admin issues a transaction to remove a validator x from its
list of validators, a call to event InitiateChange will be
emitted after removing x (using deleteArrayElement). To
persist the change, another call to finalizeChange is needed.
However, the implementation actually allows two consecutive
calls InitiateChange without a call to finalizeChange.
As a result, this bug can result in the PoA contract to fail to
remove validators that are initiated to be removed.
In addition to the manually-added assertions that check the
three afore-mentioned properties, the PoA governance contracts
contain additional assertions that were added by the original
developers. Interestingly, VERISOL also found violations of
these original assertions. However, these assertion failures
were due to developers mistakenly using assert instead of
require. Although both require and assert failures revert
an execution, Solidity recommends using assert only for
violations of internal invariants that are not expected to fail
at runtime. VERISOL found five such instances of assertion
misuse.
Unbounded verification. Unlike the semantic conformance
checking problem for client contracts, verifying properties (P1),
(P2), (P3) of the PoA contracts requires non-trivial quantified
invariants and reasoning about deeply nested arrays. Thus, we
attempted semi-automated verification of the PoA contracts by
manually coming up with contract/loop invariants and method
pre- and post-conditions. In addition, inductive proof of some of
the properties also requires introducing ghost variables that are
not present in the original code. Fully automated verification of
these properties in PoA governance contracts is an ambitious,
yet exciting area for future work.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss prior work on ensuring the
safety and security of smart contracts. Existing techniques for
smart contract security can be roughly categorized into various
categories, including static approaches for finding vulnerable
patterns, formal verification techniques, and runtime checking.
In addition, there has been work on formalizing the semantics
of EVM in a formal language such as the K Framework [20].
Finally, there are several works that discuss a survey and
taxonomy of vulnerabilities in smart contracts [13], [26], [28].
Static analysis. The set of static analysis tools are based on
a choice of data-flow analysis or symbolic execution to find
variants of known vulnerable patterns. Such patterns include the
use of reentrancy, transaction ordering dependencies, sending
ether to unconstrained addresses that may lead to lost ether, use
of block time-stamps, mishandled exceptions, calling suicide
on an unconstrained address, etc. Tools based on symbolic
execution include Oyente [26], MAIAN [28], Manticore [10],
and Mythril++ [11]. On the other hand, several data-flow
based tools also exist such as Securify [29] and Slither [12].
Finally, the MadMax tool [18] performs static analysis to
find vulnerabilities related to out-of-gas exceptions. These
tools neither check semantic conformance nor verify assertions.
Instead, they mostly find instances of known vulnerable patterns
and do not provide any soundness or completeness guarantees.
On the other hand, VERISOL does not reason about gas
consumption since it analyzes Solidity code, and it also needs
the vulnerabilities to be expressed as formal specifications.
Formal verification. F* [15] and Zeus [21] use formal verifi-
cation for checking correctness of smart contracts. These ap-
proaches translate Solidity to the formal verification languages
of F* and LLVM respectively and then apply F*-based verifiers
and constrained horn clause solvers to check the correctness
of the translated program. Although the F* based approach
is fairly expressive, the tool only covers a small subset of
Solidity without loops and requires substantial user guidance
to discharge proofs of user-specified assertions. The design
of Zeus shares similarities with VERISOL in that it translates
Solidity to an intermediate language and uses SMT based
solvers to discharge the verification problem. However, there
are several differences in the capabilities of the two works.
First, one of the key contributions of this paper is the semantic
conformance checking problem for smart contracts, which
Zeus does not address. Second, unlike our formal treatment
of the translation to Boogie, Zeus only provides an informal
description of the translation to LLVM and does not define the
memory model in the presence of nested arrays and mappings.
Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain a copy of Zeus to
try on our examples, making it difficult for us to perform an
experimental comparison for discharging assertions in Solidity
code.
Other approaches. In addition to static analyzers and formal
verification tools, there are also other approaches that enforce
safe reentrancy patterns at runtime by borrowing ideas from
linearizability [19]. Another work that is related to this paper
is FSolidM [27], which provides an approach to specify smart
contracts using a finite state machine with actions written in
Solidity. Although there is a similarity in their state machine
model with our Workbench policies, they do not consider
access control, and the actions do not have nested procedure
calls or loops. Finally, the FSolidM tool does not provide any
static or dynamic verification support.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we described one of the first uses of automated
formal verification for smart contracts in an industrial setting.
We provided formal semantics to the Workbench application
configuration, and performed automatic program instrumenta-
tion to enforce such specifications. We described a new formal
verification tool VERISOL using the Boogie tool chain, and
illustrated its application towards non-trivial smart contract
verification and bug-finding. For the immediate future, we are
working on adding more features of the Solidity language that
are used in common enterprise workflows and exploring more
sophisticated inference for inferring more complex contract
invariants.
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